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I.  INTRODUCTION
In many countries laws allow patients to put their life to an end when 
they face an incurable disease or when the sickness they suffer causes them 
an unbearable pain. This possibility usually takes shape through the with-
drawal —or not commencement at all— of a life-sustaining treatment and 
it is called passive euthanasia. This action is, in any case, an exclusive call 
of the individual due to the fact that the decision to end one’s own life 
belongs to the most personal and private sphere. 
This paper assesses a different case in the context of ending one’s own 
life, the legalization of the aid of a physician in committing suicide. The 
medical practitioner would prescribe —only prescribe— a lethal medica-
tion to the patient who demands it. Such a procedure is known as physi-
cian-assisted suicide.
The reason to analyse in particular the American system is due to the 
fact that several states in the U.S. have legalized physician-assisted sui-
cide as a right. In Europe, on the contrary, what have been recognized 
as a right by some countries like Belgium, Netherlands or Luxemburg, is 
the (active) euthanasia. The doctor contribution is less direct in the case 
of physician-assisted suicide than in the case of euthanasia, and this fact 
makes the first procedure also less controversial than the second one. 
Therefore, physician aid in dying turns out to be a less problematic solu-
tion than euthanasia and it is also safer from a legal point of view both for 
the doctor and the patient. The recognition of this procedure to put the 
patient life to an end in some states of the USA could be taken into con-
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sideration with regards to its possible legalization over the next years in 
the European context.
The beginning of this matter in the U.S. lies in the mid 1990s, when 
some of the people and groups of the American society supporting the 
right to a physician-assisted suicide challenged a number of state laws that 
had punished suicide assistance. For this purpose, they aimed to extend 
the reasoning of the Supreme Court decision at Cruzan v. Director  1. They 
argued that the liberty interest as stated in the Fourteenth Amendment 
encompassed the right to end one’s own life, a supposed «right to die»  2. 
Being so, since the right to die existed, it was also necessary to acknowl-
edge the right to be helped by someone else to commit suicide. As a con-
sequence of those appeals against legislations banning assisted suicide, the 
Supreme Court clarified its previous doctrine on the right to refuse med-
ical treatment and its scope with regards to assisted suicide. These deci-
sions would guide the state lawmakers on how to regulate this practice, a 
red-hot issue still today, recently included in several state legislations. 
II.  THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND THE RIGHT 
TO REFUSE THE MEDICAL TREATMENT
The United States Supreme Court ruled on the right to refuse medical 
treatment when it heard the case of young Nancy Cruzan, who was in a 
persistent vegetative state after being involved in a car accident. Once her 
parents knew for sure she would neither regain consciousness nor her con-
dition would improve, they demanded the withdrawal of artificial nutrition 
and hydration that kept her alive. A judge’s authorization was needed to 
achieve this purpose, and they got it from a trial court. At age twenty-five 
the patient had expressed that she would like to have her life-sustaining 
treatment removed if she ever were in her current situation, and the trial 
court found that it proved clearly enough her wishes, displaying her con-
stitutional right to refuse the treatment. 
1 Cruzan v. Director, MDH, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990).
2 For more information, see A. meisel and K. l. CerminArA, The Right to Die: The 
Law of End-of-life Decision-making, Englewood, Aspen Publishers, 2004, Chap. XII, p. 21; 
C. Tomás-VAlienTe lAnuzA, La disponibilidad de la propia vida en el Derecho Penal, Madrid, 
Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 1999, pp. 217-267, and D. GrACiA Guillén, 
«Morir a tiempo. La eutanasia y sus alternativas», Claves de razón práctica, n.º 152 (2005), 
pp. 10-19.
Foro, Nueva época, vol. 19, núm. 2 (2016): 247-263 249
Laura Gómez Abeja Physician-assisted suicide in America...
However, this decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri  3, stating that the applicable state laws pursued the preservation 
of life, which overrides the «right to refuse». The Court found that the 
patient’s statements before the accident did not prove her will sufficiently 
and, therefore, outweighed such public interest. Likewise, it rejected the 
reasoning accepting her parents to be entitled to make the decision on her 
behalf, concluding that no person can assume the choice for an incompe-
tent in the absence of clear evidence of her wishes. The Court held that 
the role of an incompetent person’s guardian stems from the state parens 
patriae  4 authority. Therefore, the guardian should act as the state would: 
always preserving life. 
When the Supreme Court of the United States heard the case, it finally 
recognized the «right to refuse», a right that could already be found at an 
extensive case-law of state supreme courts and federal courts  5. 
Since the case involved an incompetent person, the Court would con-
cern itself specially with this kind of patient. It is clear —the Supreme 
Court stated— that these people cannot make this decision in the exer-
cise of the hypothetical right and therefore someone should do it on 
their behalf. Although the Missouri law recognized that a surrogate may 
make the decision, this should be done through a procedural safeguard 
to assure that the surrogate’s action was the same as the patient’s if she 
was competent. This safeguard required clear and convincing evidence of 
her desire to have life-sustaining treatments withdrawn. The question was 
then to determine if the United States Constitution forbade (to the law of 
Missouri) the establishment of this procedural safeguard. This clear and 
convincing evidence is the intermediate level of proof in the United States 
legal system and it means that there shouldn’t be any substantial doubt 
(on the decision made)  6. 
3 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
4 The concept parens patriae has its roots in the English Law, whereby a person makes 
a decision on behalf of another as if they had done it themselves if they were competent. 
However, in its adaptation to the U.S. Law, it loses its subjective element. The exercise of 
the parens patriae power means in this context making the decision on behalf of the incom-
petent looking for his or her best interest, understood as what the state and most of the peo-
ple understood as appropriate. See P. simón lorDA and M. i. bArrio, ¿Quién decidirá por 
mí?, Madrid, Triacastela, 2004, pp. 21-24.
5 Among others, the rulings in cases Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 
705 (Sup.Ct. 1962); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill.2d 361 (1965); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 
(D.C. 1972); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); or finally, Superintentendent of 
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
6 In the U.S. Law, there are three primary standards of proof: 1) preponderance of evi-
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The United States Supreme Court also recognized the competent’s right 
to refuse treatment, taking as a reference both the common and constitu-
tional law. On the one hand, as the Court would remind, the recognition of 
the right to bodily integrity has been developed further through the doc-
trine of the informed consent prior to the treatment. To this end, it quot-
ed the most important case-law  7 and the famous words of Judge Cardozo 
in the case of Schloendorff:
«Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who per-
forms an operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault for 
which he is liable in damages»  8.
The Court holds that the logical consequence of the informed con-
sent doctrine is that the patient also has the right not to consent, that is, 
the right to refuse the treatment. This way it acknowledges the right to 
refuse as embodied in the common- law doctrine of informed consent, in 
the first place  9. 
On the other hand, the Court then mentioned the other potential pillar 
of the right, which is the basis thereof in a number of rulings  10. According 
to the Court, the principle that a competent person has the constitutional 
right to refuse a treatment might be inferred from their previous decisions. 
In other words, it is assumed that the United States Constitution guaran-
tees a competent person’s right to refuse a medical treatment. Unlike many 
dence, which is the lowest standard of proof, required in most civil cases. It requires that 
there is a greater chance of success by making the decision than by not making it; 2) clear 
and convincing evidence, which is the middle standard of proof. This is also used in civil 
cases, as long as civil rights are at stake, and in some criminal procedures. The clear and con-
vincing standard requires that the evidence presented is with a higher probability to be true 
and so clear as not to leave substantial doubts; 3) evidence beyond reasonable doubt is the 
one required in criminal cases and requires almost absolute certainty.
7 Among others, the main decisions adopted in Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 
U.S. 250, 251 (1891), and Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-
30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914); quoted in Cruzan v. Director, MDH, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
8 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-130, 105 N.E. 92 
(1914).
9 «The logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient general-
ly possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment» [Cruzan v. Director, MDH, 
497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990)].
10 See, for instance, the judgments in cases State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 
(1962); Raleigh Fit kin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 
537 (1964); or in Holmes v. Silver Cross Hospital, 340 F. Supp. 125 (ND.Ill. 1972).
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other courts, the Supreme Court did not include this right as part of the 
privacy and chose instead to identify patient’s autonomy with a Fourteenth 
Amendment’s liberty interest:
«Although many state courts have held that a right to refuse treatment 
is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, we have 
never so held. We believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest»  11.
The question then arises as to why the Supreme Court does not relate 
the right to refuse medical treatment with the right to privacy. From my 
point of view there are two main reasons. Firstly we have the controversial 
nature of the right of privacy. Although it had been considered a funda-
mental constitutional right, the U.S. Constitution contains no express right 
to privacy. As the U.S. Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade:
«The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In 
a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. 
Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), the Court has recognized that a 
right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of priva-
cy, does exist under the Constitution»  12.
Despite of this doctrine, there have always been juridical and academ-
ic voices to discredit such a right. It is remarkable, for instance, the dis-
11 Cruzan v. Director, MDH, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990).
12 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Supreme Court then specifies [Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 152-153 (1973)]:
In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots 
of that right in the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); in the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), see Olmstead v. Unit-
ed States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (j. Brandeis, dissenting); in the penumbras of the Bill of 
Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 484-485; in the Ninth Amendment, ibid., at 486 
(j. Goldberg, concurring); or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). These decisions 
make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed «fundamental» or «implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty», Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), are included in 
this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that the right has some extension 
to activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S., 
at 453-454; ibid., at 460, 463-465 [410 U.S. 113, 153] (j. White, concurring in result); family 
relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), and child rearing and educa-
tion, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska.
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senting voice of Justice Black in the Griswold v. Connecticut case, where he 
denied the existence of a supposed right of privacy, which is not protected 
by any constitutional provision: 
«The Court talks about a constitutional “right of privacy” as though 
there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law 
ever to be passed which might abridge the “privacy” of individuals. But 
there is not»  13.
Specially after the assumption that the right to abortion fell within the 
right to privacy, a very intense legal debate and a lively controversy arose 
in the American society. It was in Roe v. Wade where the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that:
«This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we 
feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s 
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a wom-
an’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy»  14.
But then years later, in a new case related to the right to abortion, the 
Supreme Court reduced the level of constitutional acknowledgment of 
privacy. It was in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, in 1992, when the Court 
affirmed that:
«In Roe v. Wade, the Court recognized a “guarantee of personal priva-
cy” which “is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or 
not to terminate her pregnancy” [410 U.S., 113, 152-153 (1973)]. We are 
now of the view that, in terming this right fundamental, the Court in Roe 
read the earlier opinions upon which it based its decision much too broad-
ly. Unlike marriage, procreation, and contraception, abortion “involves 
the purposeful termination of a potential life” [Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297, 325 (1980)]. The abortion decision must therefore be recognized as 
sui generis, different in kind from the others that the Court has protected 
under the rubric of personal or family privacy and autonomy […] Nor do 
the historical traditions of the American people support the view that the 
right to terminate one’s pregnancy is “fundamental”»  15.
13 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508 (1965).
14 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
15 The following aspects of the judgment in case Planned Parenthood v. Casey [505 U.S. 
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This first argument is closely linked with a second reason that I men-
tioned before. The identification of the right to refuse treatments with the 
privacy would mean —according to the opinion of several authors—  16 
recognizing it as a fundamental right, which would have different con-
sequences as if it was a «mere» constitutional right. Basically, the laws 
restricting the fundamental rights must pass strict scrutiny  17, which means 
that the legal regulation or decision must be justified by a compelling state 
interest, which needs to be protected. Furthermore, its only purpose must 
be serving that compelling interest and in order to protect it, it must use 
the least restrictive means. However, the «non-fundamental» constitution-
al rights may be regulated by rules to which a different level of scrutiny is 
applied. The so-called rational basis review is used to determine if the law 
or policy is reasonable to achieve a goal pursued by the state. It demands 
this law or policy to be rationally related to a legitimate state interest, 
which must neither be compelling nor the pursued interest: it is enough 
that the law or policy pursues a legitimate interest  18.
833 (1992)], might be highlighted: the decision obviates any mention to the concept of pri-
vacy (except for the case citations and the dissenting votes). Likewise, it reduces the level of 
scrutiny, which determines the constitutionality of U.S. acts. Although the highest level 
of scrutiny had been established for the acts limiting the right to abortion —strict scruti-
ny— conceived for certain fundamental constitutional rights, Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
applied a less restrictive level of scrutiny —rational basis—, and eventually recognized via-
bility as the point at which the state interest in the life of the fetus outweighs the right of the 
woman to abort, which means that abortion may be banned entirely from the moment the 
fetus is viable. Unlike what was established in Roe, a fetus can be considered viable after 22 
or 23 weeks, and not at 28 weeks of gestation.
16 Among others, C. juAnATey DorADo, «La disponibilidad del derecho a la vida en la 
jurispru dencia y en la legislación de los Estados Unidos de América», Jueces para la demo-
cracia, n.º 45 ( 2002), p. 61; j. ChoPer, r. y. FAllon, KAmisAr and s. shiFFrin, Leading Cases 
in American Constitutional Law, Saint Paul, Thomson West, 2007, p. 193, and C. Tomás-
VAlienTe lAnuzA, La disponibilidad de la propia vida…, op. cit., pp. 219 et seq.
17 The levels of scrutiny were first applied in the case United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts, in 1938, where three standards of judicial review for state laws were established 
(and by extension, of Governmental actions and courts decisions). The level of scrutiny 
applied to legislation involving fundamental rights or suspect classifications which can 
affect the Equal Protection Clause is the strict scrutiny. There is an intermediate level 
of scrutiny (intermediate scrutiny), also applicable when the Equal Protection Clause 
might be challenged. It must be proven that the law or policy furthers an important State 
interest in a way that is substantially related to that interest. Finally, the default stand-
ard of review that courts apply when considering constitutional questions is the ration-
al basis review.
18 In this decision the Supreme Court did not classify the public interests to which it 
referred. Nonetheless, it could be inferred that these are just legitimate interests (non-com-
pelling), as the right to refuse medical treatment is conceived as a part of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s liberty interest.
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Therefore, and according to the most widely accepted doctrine, regula-
tions restricting fundamental constitutional rights are presumably uncon-
stitutional, whereas those restricting non-fundamental constitutional rights 
are deemed constitutional.
The difference between considering the right to refuse medical treat-
ment as a fundamental or «just» a constitutional right is clear. And the 
idea that ruling it out as an expression of the privacy is a way to avoid such 
a strict control of the state laws regulating this right does not seem far-
fetched. The Supreme Court’s intention seemed to be in fact leaving these 
questions to the discretion of the states, and the way to do it was to leave 
out the controversial right to privacy.
III.  THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RIGHT  
TO PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
1. New York State Law banning Assisting Suicide
The Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the law banning the 
assisted suicide in the State of New York because of its potential violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment  19. This is what 
the respondents stated in the case Vacco v. Quill et al.  20, whom the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit had ruled in favour of  21. The Supreme 
Court’s decision, which overruled the one by the Court of Appeals, can help 
us understand the extension of the previously acknowledged right.
The Equal Protection Clause, as the Court reminded, provides that «no 
state shall deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws», which implies a principle of equality rather than a substantive 
19 The Equal Protection Clause is part of the Fourteenth Amendment and provides that 
«no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws». 
The legislation involving suspect classifications, as well as those regulating fundamental 
rights, must pass strict scrutiny to assess its constitutionality, as a guarantee that the Equal 
Protection Clause has been applied.
20 Vacco v. Quill et al., 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
21 The respondents were some authorities on behalf of the state and three physicians 
who looked to prescribe lethal medication for mentally competent, terminally ill patients, 
who were suffering great pain and desired the doctors help in taking their own lives to an 
end. However, they were deterred from doing so by New York’s ban on assisting suicide, 
which they considered violated the Equal Protection Clause since a competent person could 
refuse medical treatment, which in their opinion was essentially the same thing as physician-
assisted suicide.
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right. Therefore, the states’ duty is to treat similarly-situated individuals in 
a similar manner. However, different cases might be handled differently  22. 
The Supreme Court finds that New York’s laws on assisted suicide and 
the laws allowing patients to refuse medical treatments do not treat dif-
ferently or make a distinction between citizens, as such laws establish that 
every competent person has the right to refuse medical treatments and that 
nobody is allowed to assist in another person’s suicide.
If the Court of Appeals found that the different treatment had been 
unjustified, it was because its argument was based on a wrong premise: 
considering that a life-sustaining treatment and a physician-assisted suicide 
were essentially the same thing. The Supreme Court believes that there is 
an important difference between the two of them. In the first place, when 
a person refuses a life-sustaining treatment, he or she dies from the under-
lying condition. However, when a person who despite being terminal-
ly ill takes a lethal medication to end with his or her life, the cause of the 
death is that medication  23. There is also a difference about intentionality: 
the doctor who withdraws a life sustaining treatment to the patient —who 
somehow asks for it— aims to respect that patient’s wishes and to help 
stopping the suffering, and the same can be said when the doctor provides 
palliative medication. But this is not the aim in the case of assisted suicide, 
which looks for the death of the patient in the first place. The Supreme 
Court affirms that this variance of targets has been generally acknowl-
edged by the courts and that it has also been reflected in several state laws, 
including New York act discussed in this decision.
The Supreme Court then clarifies its statements on the Cruzan case 
about an alleged right to die, stating now that although it recognized the 
protection of the right to refuse treatments as part of the liberty interest 
from the Fourteenth Amendment, the origin of this right is in the common 
law tradition and not in a supposed right to accelerate death, which would 
be a consequence of the refusal:
22 Vacco v. Quill et al., 521 U.S. 793, 800 (1997); the Supreme Court quotes Plyler v. 
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982): «The Constitution does not require things which are differ-
ent in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same». In this decision 
the Court cited also Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
23 The Supreme Court —Vacco v. Quill et al., 521 U.S. 793, 798 (1997)— quotes In re 
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A. 2d 1209, 1226 (1985), one of the first where this statement was 
made, and also mentions a previous case, In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 123, 660 P. 2d 738, 
743 (1983). Finally the Supreme Court cites People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 470-472, 
527 N. W. 2d 714, 728 (1994), a case exposed to broad media coverage about a physician 
who had assisted in the death of many patients and who was later convicted.
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«In Cruzan v. Director [497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)], we concluded that 
“[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred 
from our prior decisions”, and we assumed the existence of such a right 
for purposes of that case. But our assumption of a right to refuse treatment 
was grounded not, as the Court of Appeals supposed, on the proposition 
that patients have a general and abstract “right to hasten death”, but on 
well established, traditional rights to bodily integrity and freedom from 
unwanted touching [Cruzan, 497 U.S., 278-279, 287-288 (1990)]. In fact, 
we observed that “the majority of states in this country have laws imposing 
criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit suicide”»  24.
The Court held consequently that the assisted suicide legislation does 
not affect the constitutional rights —whether they are fundamental or 
not— and that it does not contain any «suspect classification  25. Therefore, 
as already mentioned when examining the Cruzan case, there is a strong 
presumption of constitutionality in this statute. The Court finally stated 
that the law also responds to legitimate state interests, a necessary requi-
site so that certain interests or rights can be limited  26.
2. Washington State Law banning Assisting Suicide
The constitutionality of the law forbidding assisted suicide was likewise 
questioned in the State of Washington. In the Washington et al. v. Glucksberg 
et al.  27 case a group of four physicians, three terminally-ill patients —who had 
already died when the United States Supreme Court heard the case— and 
the non-profit organization «Compassion in dying», that supported patients 
seeking physician aid in dying, asked the U.S. District Court to declare this 
24 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807 (1997).
25 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997):
The Equal Protection Clause commands that no state shall «deny to any person with-
in its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. This provision creates no substantive 
rights» [San Antonio Independent School Dist.v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973)]. Instead, 
it embodies a general rule that states must treat like cases alike but may treat unlike cases 
accordingly [Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)]. «[T]he Constitution does not require 
things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the 
same» [Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)].
26 These state interests will be further analyzed in Washington v. Glucksberg, another 
Supreme Court case decided together with Vacco.
27 Washington et al. v. Glucksberg et al., 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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law unconstitutional  28. The plaintiffs held that this law limited the liber-
ty interest from the Fourteenth Amendment, since this liberty entailed the 
right of an adult with a terminal illness to commit physician-assisted suicide. 
The District Court initially ruled in their favour. Then a panel of the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, but the Ninth Circuit reheard the 
case en banc  29, reversed the panel’s decision, and affirmed the District Court 
decision, later appealed to the federal Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court reminds that when hearing due process cases  30, it 
is necessary to start by analysing the historical background, legal traditions 
and praxis. After reviewing the state statutes, the Court concludes that the 
assisted suicide is in most cases punished. Likewise, in the common law 
 tradition, both committing suicide and helping someone to die have been 
traditionally penalized. Although the stance on suicide has evolved over 
the years  31, the opinion on assisted suicide has not. Indeed, the latter is still 
banned despite the new reflections upon the concept of death due to the 
new life-sustaining treatments arisen in modern medical technology.
Besides, the Supreme Court reminds that the Due Process Clause guar-
antees more than a fair process, and the liberty it protects implies more 
than the absence of physical restraint. However, it is cautious as to consid-
ering when a liberty is part of the constitutional liberty interest. In order to 
do so, the asserted liberty must have two primary features: firstly, it must 
28 «A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids 
another person to attempt suicide» [Wash. Rev. Code 9A.36.060 (1) (1994)].
29 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F. 3d 790, 798 (1996).
30 The Fifth and Fifteenth Amendments provide that no person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law. The first of them limits the power of the fed-
eral government, while the second one, passed some years later, limits the power of the states. 
The Due Process Clause has two aspects: procedural and substantive. The Procedural Due 
Process guarantees a fair procedure before carrying out decisions depriving life, liberty or 
property. The term «substantive cases» began to take form in 1930s case law as a distinction 
of procedural cases. The concept has greatly evolved since, going through different stages. 
Nowadays the Substantive Due Process (SDP) involves cases where due process appears in 
relation to freedom, and some outcomes are sought, rather than simply questioning the pro-
cedures and their effects. To summarize, it can be stated that when a law or policy is said to 
affect the Due Process Clause, if its substantive aspect is involved, it means the same as when 
it is said to affect the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty interest. See l. h. see Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law, Mineola, The Foundation Press, 1988, pp. 769 et seq., and j. e. nowAK 
and r. D. roTunDA, Constitutional Law, Saint Paul, West Group, 1991, pp. 351-562.
31 The Court points out the earliest reference to suicide in common law, which trac-
es back to the 13th century, made by one of the first English jurists, Henry of Bracton. The 
Court uses the work of G. wooDbine, Bracton on Laws and Customs of England, Cambridge 
(Massachusetts), Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 423; quoted in Washington et al. v. 
Glucksberg et al., 521 U.S. 702, 711 (1997).
Laura Gómez Abeja Physician-assisted suicide in America...
Foro, Nueva época, vol. 19, núm. 2 (2016): 247-263258
be rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition. Secondly, a careful descrip-
tion of the liberty to be included in the area of protection of the Due Pro-
cess must be provided.
Being rejected that the asserted liberty had a place in the Nation’s his-
tory and traditions, respondents pointed to two formers Supreme Court 
cases, Cruzan and Casey  32, holding that the Court concluded in both that 
protections of the Due Process Clause include a right to commit suicide 
with another’s assistance. With this «careful description» of respondents’ 
claim in mind, the Supreme Court rejected such conclusion.
On the one hand, suicide may be part of a person’s liberty, whatever it 
might be called («agere licere» or personal autonomy at the constitution-
al Spanish jurisprudence), but never —like the «right to refuse» acknowl-
edged in Cruzan— of the common law, the statutes, the historical tradition 
or the case-law. This same interpretation can be found in the jurispru-
dence of several constitutional courts or institutions vested with the power 
to defend the human rights. For example, the first of the «GRAPO judg-
ments» in the Spanish jurisprudence  33, the case of D. Pretty v. Director 
of Public Prosecutions  34 in the United Kingdom and Rodriguez v. British 
Columbia  35 in the Canadian jurisprudence. We could also highlight the 
European Court of Human Rights’ judgment in case Haas v. Switzerland  36 
and the decision by the Human Rights Committee in the case of Sanlés v. 
Spain  37. All of them held that there is no a right to die as a potential nega-
tive dimension of the right to life  38.
On the other hand, the alleged consistency with the Casey case cannot 
either be admitted: the fact that many rights protected by the Due Process 
Clause derive from the personal autonomy does not imply that all person-
al decisions have this protection. Besides, the respondents offer an ambig-
uous and generic description of the alleged right, which does not fulfill the 
32 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
33 Constitutional Court Judgment number 120/1990, June the 27th.
34 Case of D. Pretty v. Director of Public Prosecutions and Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, November the 29th , 2001 [(2001) UKHL 61].
35 Case of Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), March the 25th, 1993 
[(1993) 3 S.C.R.].
36 Case of Haas v. Switzerland, ECHR, January the 20th, 2011 (31322/07).
37 Case of M. Sanlés Sanlés v. Spain, March the 30th, 2004 (communication number 
1024/2001).
38 On this subject, see l. m. Díez-PiCAzo Giménez, Sistema de derechos fundamentales, 
Cizur Menor, Thomson-Civitas, 2008, pp. 229-231, and j. Pérez royo, Curso de Derecho 
Constitucional, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2010, pp. 254 et seq.
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requisite of a necessary careful description so that it can be included in the 
Due Process Clause  39.
As expected, the Supreme Court ruled that the right to the physi-
cian-assisted suicide is not a liberty interest protected by the Due Process 
Clause. Finally the Court held as well that by forbidding the assisted sui-
cide the act pursues the protection of several legitimate public interests, 
which essentially concur with those intended to be protected in the right-
to-die cases: preservation of life, prevention of suicide, integrity of ethics 
in Medicine and protection of the most vulnerable groups  40.
IV.  CURRENT STATE REGULATIONS ON PHYSICIAN-
ASSISTED SUICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES
As stated above, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the 
state acts punishing the physician-assisted suicide are not contrary to the 
Constitution. However, it doesn’t prevent the state statutes from acknowl-
edging assisted suicide as a legal right instead, something very exception-
al to date.
Oregon was the first state to legalize this practice. In 1994 Oregon vot-
ers approved the Ballot Measure 16, a citizen initiative —sponsored by 
the Hemlock Society, which later became Compassion and Choices—, 
which legitimated the Death with Dignity Act  41. This act allowed compe-
tent adults with a life expectancy of 6 months or less to ask their physician 
for a prescription of life-ending medication. But a few days after the Ore-
gon Death with Dignity Act came into effect, a group of citizens challenged 
39 Abstract concepts like «control of the last days» do not accomplish that accuracy 
requirement.
40 The last public interest legitimizing the patients’ rights in the context of the right-to-
die cases was the protection of innocent third parties, which allowed the coercive imposi-
tion of treatment, for instance in order to protect the dependent child or the nasciturus (in 
the case of pregnant women). In the cases of physician-assisted suicide, the vulnerable group 
consists of terminally ill patients, although it extends also to the elderly and the disabled, 
whom they want to protect from «prejudice, negative and inaccurate stereotypes and soci-
etal indifference» [Washington v. Glucksberg et al., 521 U.S. 702, 732 (1997)]. The Supreme 
Court points a fifth interest usually applied in these cases: the slippery slope, that could lead 
from this practice to euthanasia. From my point of view, this interest could be included in 
the second interest- the prevention of suicide- understood in a broad sense.
41 The Oregon Constitution allows voters to propose, approve or reject laws and con-
stitutional amendments, independently from the Legislative Assembly. Furthermore, it gives 
the voters the power to pass or reject any action originated in the Assembly.
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its constitutionality in the U.S. District Court, which ruled in their favor 
by considering that the act violated the Equal Protection Clause  42. Three 
years later, after the decision was overruled by the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals for procedural reasons, the Oregon Legislative Assembly sent the 
act back to the citizens and «Measure 51» was adopted by a wider margin 
than the first time. Although the legal battle over the act has been going on 
in courts for many years, it has been steadily applied ever since.
Washington was the second state to regulate assisted suicide. A simi-
lar process to the one is Oregon was followed, being its act taken as a ref-
erence. The Initiative 119 tried to introduce an amendment to the Wash-
ington’s Natural Death Act of 1979 so that physician-assisted suicide was 
legalized. It was rejected by the voters in 1991. It was not until 2008 that 
Washington voters approved the Initiative 1000, based on Oregon Meas-
ure 16  43. This initiative established the Washington Death with Dignity Act, 
which legalized physician-assisted dying for adults with a life expectancy 
of 6 months or less. Like the Oregon act, Washington’s law requires the 
patient to self-administer the medication without the physician assistance.
In Montana, the third state to authorize this practice, it was its Supreme 
Court who legitimized it when hearing a case from a patient who wanted 
to be assisted in dying. It was the Baxter v. Montana  44 case, where a termi-
nally-ill patient requested his constitutional right to assisted suicide to be 
acknowledged. He also demanded that the practice didn’t have any legal 
consequence for the physicians assisting him, who were also plaintiffs. The 
District Court held that the Montana constitutional rights of human digni-
ty and privacy, taken together, encompass the right to die with dignity and 
to be assisted by a physician to do so. An appeal was filed and heard by 
the Montana Supreme Court, which decided not to rule upon the consti-
tutional ground. The Court only had to point out that there was no indi-
cation in the state legislation from which it could be concluded that physi-
cian aid in dying to adult patients was against the public policy. Therefore, 
the physician would not be criminally responsible if the patient consent-
ed to it.
In May 2013 Vermont approved the Patient Choice and Control at End 
of Life Act, becoming the first state to enact such a law just by the legisla-
ture (the name of the legislative body in this state is General Assembly), as 
42 Lee v. State of Oregon, 891 F.Supp. 1439 (D.Or.1995). 
43 Firstly fifty-four per cent of the popular vote rejected Initiative 119, but then Initia-
tive 120 was adopted by the support of almost fifty-eight per cent of the votes.
44 354 Mont. 234, 224 P.3d 1211 (2009).
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it was never put to a referendum  45. The act includes very similar provisions 
to the Oregon and Washington acts: it allows terminally-ill adult patients 
—18 years old or older— residents of Vermont, competent to make an 
informed decision and whose life expectancy is 6 months or less, to be pre-
scribed aid-in-dying medication.
One of the differences between those acts and the one from Vermont 
lies in the information that the physician must provide to the patient. 
In the first two acts, although it is generally provided that the physician 
gives the patient all kinds of information, the laws don’t compel doctors 
to inform the patient specifically about the possibility of being prescribed 
lethal drugs. On the contrary, the Patient Choice and Control at End of Life 
Act, after establishing the voluntary nature of the physicians involvement 
in the lethal practice, it states that they are forced to inform the patient 
about all the options available to face the illness, including the possibili-
ty of being prescribed drugs to end life. Physicians not willing to provide 
that information must refer the patient to another doctor or take all nec-
essary measures so the patient receives all the information about this alter-
native procedure.
California has very recently become the second state to enact a law like 
the one in Vermont. The End Of Life Option Act was passed in a legisla-
tive «extraordinary session» in march 2016, and went into effect in june 
9. After a first try to legalize this practice unsuccessfully, the End of Life 
Option Act was passed without being put to a referendum, as was the case 
of the Vermont act. The law requires two doctors to agree that a patient 
has six months or less to live and it is also necessary that the patient is at 
least 18 years old with the capacity to make medical decisions. Patients 
have to be able as well to swallow the medication themselves and they 
must affirm in writing, 48 hours before taking the medication, that they 
will do so.
Finally, the assisted suicide was recently legalized in New Mexico judi-
cially, as it happened in Nebraska through the Supreme Court’s ruling 
examined before, but in this case by a federal court. On January 13, 2014 
the judges of the Second Judicial District, based on the case of a cancer 
patient who wished to be prescribed the lethal medication without the 
physicians suffering any legal consequences, ruled that the Court could 
not envision:
45 The End of Life Choice Bill was approved by the House of Representatives by a 
75-65 vote.
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«A right more fundamental, more private or more integral to the liber-
ty, safety and happiness of a New Mexican than the right of a competent, 
terminally ill patient to choose aid in dying»  46.
There are states where the legalization of this practice has been pro-
posed without succeeding so far. It is the case of New Jersey or Massachu-
setts where the majority of citizens voted against the proposal. The con-
stitutional basis of physician-assisted suicide has been rejected also in the 
judicial area. The Florida Supreme Court, in a totally opposite way to what 
was recently stated in New Mexico, denied that the state Constitution’s pri-
vacy amendment guaranteed terminally-ill patients the right to be assist-
ed in dying and even held that the preservation of life is a compelling state 
interest which can only be guaranteed by defending the law which prohib-
its the assisted suicide  47. The Alaska Supreme Court reached a similar con-
clusion, as it denied that the state Constitution’s privacy and liberty entailed 
the right of terminally-ill patients to be assisted in dying by a physician. 
Although this Supreme Court also declared that the state act prohibiting 
such a practice did not violate the constitutional right to equal protection, 
as alleged by the plaintiffs, it didn’t go so far as to consider that this was the 
only option for the law to be constitutional, as was the case in Florida. This 
decision is therefore more in line with the United States Supreme Court’s 
doctrine as it did consider that the physician-assisted suicide might be per-
mitted by the state Constitution if the lawmaker decided to legalize it  48.
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
To summarize, according to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, phy-
sician-assisted suicide is not protected by the Due Process Clause or the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty interest, as it does not entail a right to 
end one’s own life. The Supreme Court denied the existence of the consti-
tutional right to die and therefore of a right to aid in doing so by a third 
person on its decisions in Vacco and Glucksberg, both originated in the 
46 The Court then wondered: «If decisions made in the shadow of one’s imminent death 
regarding how they and their loved ones will face that death are not fundamental and at the 
core of these constitutional guarantees, then what decisions are?» [Morris v. New Mexico, 
No. D-202-CV 2012-02909, paragraph HH].
47  Krischer v. Mciver, No. 89837, 1997.
48 Sampson v. Alaska, 31 P.3d 88 (Alaska, 2001).
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challenge of the state act punishing aid-in-dying. Moreover, this doctrine 
is in line with the jurisprudence of most of the constitutional or quasi-con-
stitutional courts.
The fact that the state laws penalizing the aid-in-dying haven’t been 
considered unconstitutional has not prevented other states from passing 
laws recognizing conversely this practice as a legal right. Other states have 
judicially determined that, although the prohibition was not against the 
U.S. Constitution, physician-assisted suicide was indeed an expression of 
the state constitutional rights.
Anyhow, the states that have legitimized this practice are only a few, 
as the issue still gives rise to a great controversy, not only in the U.S. soci-
ety but almost everywhere where it has been raised. In this regard, the 
diversity of the debate is shown by the significant different ways in which 
the states have faced it, from those recognizing the aid-in-dying legally as 
a right to those protecting themselves against this practice forbidding it 
expressely by law in the medical field  49.
As a means of a conclusion, two ideas can be put forward. Leaving to 
one side the different opinions raised by this kind of procedures, it has to 
be admitted that its legalization would mean and objective improvement in 
the juridical situation both of the patient and the physician. Besides, there 
is certainly another positive aspect deriving from the regulation of phy-
sician-assisted suicide. The implication of the physician being less direct 
than in active euthanasia, from an ethical point of view physician-assisted 
suicide could entail a lesser compromise of the professional in the act of 
ending the patient’s life.
49 Such is the case with the State of Alabama. Other states have no provisions regard-
ing aid-in-dying. Therefore, it is unclear whether in these states providing this type of 
 physician care is illegal.
This information comes essentially from the following web sites http://www.
patientsrightscouncil.org/site/assisted-suicide-state-laws/and http://euthanasia.procon.org/
view.resource.php?resourceID=000132 (last consulted on December, 29th 2015).

